Read The Hindu Notes of 26th December 2018 for UPSC Civil Service Examination, State Civil Service Examination and other competitive Examination

The Hindu Notes for 26th December 2018
  • Topic Discussed: The Hindu Notes of 26th December 2018

    • Elections in an embattled democracy

    Voters in Bangladesh face an imperfect choice: a heavy-handed incumbent versus a party that has stoked extremism

  • Elections in Bangladesh are famously a blood sport. During the campaigns virtually every constituency turns into its own bull ring, as party cadres treat rival banners like a matador’s red cape. With polls slated for December 30, the first two weeks of canvassing have already seen eight deaths and dozens injured. Given our historic standards, though, these numbers are still pretty low.
  • With a first-past-the-post system, Bangladesh’s elections come down to a choice between coalitions led by the two major political parties: the secular-centrist Awami League and the quasi-Islamist Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The Awami League has governed since 2009, delivering economic growth and rolling back extremist militancy. The country hit 7.86% GDP growth in 2017-18. Under the Awami League government, the country’s power output has quadrupled in the last decade, and Bangladesh has topped regional rankings on many social indicators such as gender parity in primary education and maternal mortality.

    • The BNP threat

  • Yet, the much beleaguered BNP still poses a threat to the Awami League. In addition to traditional anti-incumbency, a swathe of the public — especially sections of the intelligentsia and urban youth — has grown weary of the Awami League’s heavy-handed rule, which was sorely on display during two rounds of student protests earlier this year. The Awami League also passed a needlessly harsh Digital Security Bill earlier this year. This has not gone down well with an increasingly digitised populace. Ironically enough, it is the ruling party’s own massive programme of “Digital Bangladesh” that has led to the mass adoption of tech and Internet services.
  • Despite some just criticism of the Awami League’s record on rights, critics who pretend that authoritarianism is a problem unique to the Awami League are being disingenuous. Not only did Bangladesh suffer military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, the country has struggled to establish a culture of political tolerance even since the advent of democracy in 1991.
  • To understand why, a quick recap of pivotal moments of the past is unavoidable. The BNP won the first democratic polls in 1991, but refused to step down when their tenure ended in 1996. The Awami League led a mass movement to topple the BNP government and won the ensuing polls. In a contrast to the BNP, the Awami League voluntarily stepped down from power in 2001, and handed over the reins to an interim government as the Constitution required back then.
  • The BNP went on to win the 2001 polls, raising hopes of more trust-building measures. Instead, the BNP celebrated its victory in October 2001 with a pogrom on Hindu minorities that left hundreds killed, raped or injured across many districts. The BNP also pivoted sharply to the right and gave political patronage to extremist outfits which carried out a series of fatal attacks. One attack, in August 2004, targeted Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina, killing 19 people and injuring hundreds. Among the dead was Ivy Rahman, head of the women’s wing of the Awami League. A separate attack the following year killed the Awami League’s former Finance Minister Shah A.M.S. Kibria.
  • When the BNP’s tenure came to an end in 2006, once again the party refused to hand over power to a credible caretaker government. The ensuing Awami League protests led to a stalemate that was broken finally with the installation of a military-backed regime in January 2007. Dhaka’s self-styled “civil society”, dominated by Anglophone members of non-governmental organisations, and media, who enjoy disproportionate access to and credence with foreign diplomats and media, supported that non-democratic regime.

    • An unusual coalition

  • Today, it is a leader of that civil pack, Kamal Hossain, who has joined hands with the BNP — and by extension their ally Jamaat-e-Islami — to promise a restoration of democracy. Mr. Hossain is a renowned lawyer who was tasked by the nation’s founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to author the country’s secular constitution. He also served as a minister in Sheikh Mujib’s cabinet in the early 1970s. But he split from the Awami League in the 1990s and formed his own minor political party, the Gono Forum, which has never won a parliamentary seat.
  • Mr. Hossain had promised that he would not form any alliance with the BNP if it didn’t sever its relationship with the Jamaat. In reality, the BNP nominated 25 Jamaat leaders to contest polls on its ticket. As it happens, Mr. Hossain’s own Gono Forum is also running on the BNP’s symbol of “rice stalks”. When journalists questioned Mr. Hossain about this awkward marriage, he yelled at them to be quiet, in Urdu (“khamosh”).
  • It was perhaps always fanciful to think that any outsider could simply save the BNP, a party that has ceased to function like a mainstream participant in a democracy since 2001. Even in opposition, the BNP has resorted to grotesque forms of new violence. Ahead of the last polls, in 2014, the BNP and Jamaat sponsored petrol-bombing of commuter buses that left more than 100 dead. That violent campaign was resumed in 2015.
  • Apologists for the BNP, including members of civil society, try to argue that all parties engage in violence. While violence has been sadly endemic to Bangladeshi politics, it has been confined mainly to clashes between party cadres and police. Ordinary citizens were never the target, until the petrol-bombing campaigns of 2013 and 2015.

    • Awami League’s record

  • The Awami League has resorted to hardline tactics, no doubt. But in what democracy are incumbents facing a rival who had tried to literally bomb them out of existence? If anything, the Awami League may be at fault for not holding the BNP and Jamaat organisationally accountable for all the violence explicitly targeting civilians. It is not at all clear why groups that engage in violence akin to insurgent or terror groups should enjoy the respect or rights of a mainstream political party.
  • Voters in Bangladesh face an imperfect choice today. It may feel unpalatable to many of them to vote for an incumbent which has been excessively heavy-handed at times, while delivering much economic and social progress. But if the alternative is a party with a record of stoking extremism and targeting civilians for violence, then one must ask if it is at all wise to seek change for the sake of mere change.

    • On a shaky foundation

    Section 69 of the IT Act allows for disproportionate state action, and is antithetical to the right to privacy

  • The Union Home Secretary, last week, promulgated an order authorising 10 Central agencies to monitor, intercept and decrypt information which is transmitted, generated, stored in or received by any computer. Under the order, an individual who fails to assist these government agencies with technical assistance or extend all facilities can face up to seven years of imprisonment or be liable to be fined.
  • The notification was reportedly issued in pursuance of powers stipulated in Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which enables government agencies to intercept personal information of citizens under certain conditions. The Ministry, in response to flak from the Opposition, has issued a clarification that the authorisation is in conformity with the process stipulated in the IT Rules, 2009.

    • What is missed out

  • The clarification assumes the legitimacy of Section 69 of the IT Act, the basis on which the IT Rules were framed. The IT Rules in turn form the source of power behind the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) notification. On the basis of this assumption, the clarification justifies the notification without examining the validity of its source. All that the MHA clarifies is that since the notification conforms with the IT Rules, there is no reason for eyebrows to be raised. This, argument, however, is fallacious since it fails to take a step back and peruse Section 69 of the IT Act, which after K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India — ‘the right to privacy case’, in 2017 — seems to fail the litmus test of constitutionality. Let us explain how.
  • Why is Section 69 unconstitutional after K.S. Puttaswamy? The nine-judge bench in K.S. Puttaswamy declared that there is a fundamental right to privacy flowing from inter alia Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. In order for a restriction such as Section 69 allowing for interception of personal data on a computer to be constitutionally valid, it would not only have to pursue a legitimate state aim (say, for instance, national security) but also be proportionate, so that there is a rational nexus between the means adopted (i.e., authorisation of interception) and the aim.
  • Section 69 of the IT Act is so broadly worded that it could enable mass surveillance to achieve relatively far less serious aims such as preventing the incitement of the commission of a cognisable offence. Such surveillance could be justified to achieve relatively far less serious objectives such as a Facebook post expressing dissent against government policy which, in the state’s opinion, is offensive. The state, through the powers under Section 69, can therefore justify authorising surveillance, purporting this to be a grave concern. The language of Section 69, therefore, speaks abundantly of doublespeak, allowing for disproportionate state action, antithetical to the right to privacy.

    • Implications for free speech

  • Under Section 69, the government can intercept personal information under any of the following conditions: when it is necessary in the interest of Indian sovereignty or integrity; security of the state; friendly relations with foreign states; public order; and for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence related to these. While the first four feature in Article 19(2) of the Constitution, the last, namely preventing incitement to commission of cognisable offences, is not an enumerated restriction. A restriction in the form of authorised surveillance would not be justified unless it is in order to maintain public order, a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).
  • The Supreme Court has repeatedly accepted a hierarchisation between “public order” and law and order; it explains this through concentric circles where law and order represents the larger circle within which the next circle, public order, lies, which in turn contains the smallest circle representing the security of the state — the most grave concern. While public order is characterised by public peace and tranquillity, law and order requires preventing the incitement of an offence.
  • However, Section 69, as mentioned earlier, allows mass surveillance even when only law and order is affected while public order prevails: merely for precluding the incitement of the commission of an offence.
  • Such a broadly worded provision can have potential ramifications on free speech. This is because a constant sense of being watched can create a chilling effect on online communication, crippling dissent. As far back as 1962, Justice K. Subba Rao had explained in his powerful dissent how a “shroud of surveillance” maims individual freedom by engendering inhibitions that an individual cannot act as freely as he would want to. Surveillance does not show direct discernible harms as such but rather imposes an oppressive psychological conformism that threatens the very existence of individual freedom. The Supreme Court reiterated this view in K.S.Puttaswamy.
  • Section 69, therefore, cannot be regarded as a reasonable restriction on free speech as well. Therefore, a simple law and order requirement is an impermissible restriction to free speech unless public order, a much higher threshold, is threatened.

    • Another inconsistency

  • Section 69 also falls short of meeting with the principles of natural justice by failing to accommodate pre-decisional hearings. The Section only makes post-decisional hearings before a review committee possible as a part of its procedure, compelling people to give up their personal information without being given an opportunity to be heard.
  • To conclude, the MHA notification rests on shaky foundations. While the Supreme Court missed the opportunity to examine the constitutionality of Section 69 of the IT Act, looking at the IT Rules to legitimise the notification seems to put the cart before the horse.

    • Chabahar tidings

    As India takes over operations in the Iranian port, the possibilities and challenges are huge

  • The opening of the first office of Indian Ports Global Limited at Iran’s Chabahar and the takeover of operations of the Shahid Beheshti port is a milestone in India’s regional connectivity and trade game plan. Chabahar port opens up a permanent alternative route for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia, given the hurdles in the direct route through Pakistan. It facilitates India’s role in Afghanistan’s development through infrastructure and education projects. And it gives India’s bilateral ties with Iran, a major oil supplier and potential trade market for India, a big fillip. India has helped develop the Shahid Beheshti port with these outcomes in mind, and has been given the contract to manage it for 18 months. It will be important to operationalise the port quickly and smoothen the route to Afghanistan. The decision by India, Afghanistan and Iran to hold an international event in February 2019 to promote Chabahar and to study ways to make the route more attractive and decrease logistic costs is timely. About 500 companies have registered with the Free Trade Zone authority there. While keeping timelines and delivery of New Delhi’s commitments will be key to the port becoming a regional hub for transit trade, steel and petrochemicals, it will be necessary to encourage Afghan companies to use the route more, in line with President Ashraf Ghani’s desire to have a commercial fleet under the Afghan flag setting sail from Chabahar.
  • Visions of Chabahar’s immense potential as a game-changer for prosperity and stability in the region must, however, necessarily be tempered by the reality of geopolitical challenges. The Chabahar port has received a waiver from the U.S. sanctions on Iran for the moment, but these concessions could be withdrawn any time, given the constant upheaval in the administration. The possibility of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, after the pullout from Syria, will add to security concerns for Afghanistan and impact on the Chabahar route as well. Meanwhile, the reconciliation process with the Afghan Taliban is likely to see the regional powers, the U.S. and Russia engaging Pakistan more. This could give Islamabad space to play spoiler in Chabahar, which is seen as a rival warm water port to Pakistan’s Gwadar. That the Afghanistan government is hedging its bets on trade via Chabahar too is clear: in recent months, special cargo corridors have been opened with China, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Europe, Russia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, with more trade diverted through them than with traditional partners Pakistan and India. With Chabahar, India has done well to keep a place in the intricate connectivity network of the region. Given all the competing interests that criss-cross over Chabahar, it will require sustained and nuanced diplomacy to stay ahead in this game.

    • The worried Indian

    Actor Naseeruddin Shah had every right to express what he did without fear of retaliation

  • The intimidatory power of the mob made itself felt once again when the Ajmer Literature Festival abruptly cancelled veteran actor Naseeruddin Shah’s keynote address. This followed the torrent of abuse heaped on Mr. Shah by a loose coalition of persons, ranging from anonymous trolls on social media to functionaries of the Bharatiya Janata Party, after he spoke about the dangerous amount of power that mobs wield in India. In a reference to the violence over allegations of cow carcasses found in Uttar Pradesh’s Bulandshahr district this month that led to the killing of a police officer and another person, he spoke of the growing insecurity over being targeted by vigilante groups. “There is complete impunity for those who take law into their own hands,” said Mr. Shah. “I feel anxious thinking about my children.” Unfortunately, in this climate of hyper-nationalism, even an expression of anxiety is twisted out of context and portrayed as disloyalty to the nation. As Mr. Shah has explained, he was only speaking as a worried Indian about a country he loves. But amid the acrimonious outburst against him, no one cares to listen. A fringe group in Uttar Pradesh has offered him a one-way ticket to Karachi. And State BJP chief Mahendranath Pandey suggested, outrageously, that Mr. Shah was growing into the character of the Pakistani agent he had played in a film.
  • That a mere expression of anxiety about lawlessness and vigilantism could be fraught with such repercussions is deplorable in a democracy. Three years ago, another actor, Aamir Khan, was hounded for expressing alarm about growing intolerance; pressure was even applied on a private company to dismiss him as its brand ambassador. With each such reaction, the message is sent out to the next celebrity to hush his or her intervention in the public sphere. Governments have often given in to the mob’s diktats, either as the easy way out or for political signalling. In this case, the Rajasthan Chief Minister did the right thing by tweeting his regret over the fact that Mr. Shah couldn’t participate in the Ajmer event, saying his “administration was fully prepared to hold [the] festival peacefully”; some arrests of those who attempted to vandalise the festival venue have also been carried out. But his own record of standing up for free expression, like that of many other politicians, is marred by inconsistency and underwritten by expediency. In his previous stint as CM, Mr. Gehlot and his party were of a piece with those who pressured Salman Rushdie into pulling out of the Jaipur Literature Festival in 2012. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of those in power to support those who feel threatened for their views and to come down hard on those who attempt to silence them with intimidation and threats.

    • ‘I don’t think we should be talking to Naxals’

    The Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh on tackling Maoism, the Congress party’s revival in the State, and his government’s strategy to strengthen the rural economy

  • Bhupesh Baghel, the new Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, is considered one of the architects of the Congress’s victory in the recent Assembly election. In a free-wheeling interview, he talked about how he rebuilt the Congress after being appointed president of the party State unit in 2014, his agenda for governance, and approach to tackling Maoist violence. Excerpts:
  • What explains the impressive performance of the party in Chhattisgarh?
  • Historically, the Congress has been strong in the State. When Ajit Jogi became the Chief Minister of the newly formed State in 2000, people did not like him, for whatever reasons. This is the first time that we fought without Jogi. That is the first reason.
  • When I was made party president in 2014, I realised that by the time of the 2018 election, the BJP would have finished 15 years in office, and it would have all the resources... We had lost the Assembly three times and parliamentary elections three times. Congress workers had fallen into despondency due to repeated failures. We had absolutely no resources. We had no leadership. All our leaders — Mahendra Karma, V.C. Shukla, Nandkumar Patel... the entire leadership was lost in a tragic way [in a Maoist attack in 2013]. I brought into the party’s leadership a host of leaders between the ages of 35 and 50. In some districts, I made NSUI [National Students Union of India] leaders DCC [District Congress Committee] presidents. We observed that the BJP had turned a good section of the State administration into their blind followers. We brainstormed. The conclusion was, unless we activate our booth-level network, we have no chance of beating the BJP’s tactics. We decided that we must have at least 10-15 people in each booth, who cannot be lured or threatened. In all 90 constituencies, we did training programmes two times.
  • What could be the lessons for the Congress from Chhattisgarh for its revival in other States?
  • We started with whatever we had, to launch agitations against the government. In June 2014, as soon as the Narendra Modi government came to power, in our State, poor people saw a reduction in ration cards. We mobilised the affected people. There were localities where we got up to 3,000 people to file complaints. The success of the campaign gave a new lease of life to the organisation, our workers found new enthusiasm, and people found new trust in the Congress. Then we took up the issues of farmers. We asked them to not sell any grain, to force the government to listen to them, on December 1, 2014. There are 1,400 agriculture societies. They did not procure a single grain that day. That increased people’s trust in us even more.
  • In this fashion, whatever issue concerned the people, we took it up and led the struggle. Some were successful, some were failures. The government tried to suppress us. That gave us the strength to fight. Congress workers began educating people on the issues. What we used to discuss at the State level began to be talked about in mohallas, pan shops, tea shops. All sections of the society: the poor, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, traders, farmers, government employees... we fought for all of them. We went to jail numerous times, got out and restarted the struggle. We never gave up.
  • You have just one of the 11 Lok Sabha seats in the State. Do you hope to reverse the score in 2019?
  • We are planning to make it 100% in our favour. In the Assembly we won three-fourths, but in 2019, we will win all the seats.
  • How are you planning to select candidates for 2019?
  • Rahulji always says workers must have a say in candidate selection. For the first time, the screening committee for candidate selection went outside Delhi this year. Screening committee members went to each district, took the opinion of party workers. This time we will do the same thing: ask the party workers for their opinion on candidates for the Lok Sabha polls. We will seek their opinion on issues that they want raised. On both questions — candidate selection and issues — the final decision will be in accordance with the wishes of our workers.
  • Rebel candidates could not cause much harm to the Congress as they did in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. How come?
  • Jogi used to stay in the Congress and harm the party candidates. The first thing was to show him the way out. We were talking to the BSP [Bahujan Samaj Party] in the meanwhile; we were very keen to have them on our side. Just as we were talking, Jogi and the BSP declared an alliance. We have been saying for a long time that Jogi is the B-team of Raman Singh. That was proven again. Mayawati goes to fight elections in those places where she can harm the Congress. She does not fight where it can be damaging for the BJP. We campaigned on that issue, and people believed us.
  • What does this say about Rahul Gandhi’s leadership?
  • After he became Congress president, we won the elections in three States at one go. These victories have established him as a national leader.
  • Have you managed to woo sections such as the OBCs who were traditionally not with the Congress?
  • It is true that we lost the SC votes in some measure. But among the OBCs, our support grew. Also, among traders and the upper class.
  • Mr. Gandhi’s strategy for revival includes a special outreach to the OBCs. Chhattisgarh perhaps shows that the approach is working?
  • Yes, without a doubt. The same OBCs are also farmers. Rahulji kept farmers at the centre of his campaign. Farmers as a class cut across all castes, but nationwide, the OBCs constitute the maximum numbers among them.
  • But their representation in the Congress has not been adequate.
  • It used to be low. But see how their representation is growing now. OBCs feel that they are respected in the Congress, both in the organisation and in the government.
  • How has Mr. Gandhi’s temple visit helped you, if at all?
  • The BJP has continuously run a false campaign against the Congress, that this is only a party of the minorities. The reality is that from the beginning, the Congress has believed in the concept of equal respect for all religions. You observe whatever religion you want, but also respect the feelings of those who believe in other faiths — that has been the Congress’s philosophy. But the BJP tried to make the Congress a minority party. And they reaped the benefits of that. So Rahulji went to the mandir, masjid, gurudwara... he went to all places. That gave a message to the public that the Congress is not a party solely for the minorities and it is not against Hindus.
  • You have proposed a new slogan for the State: Narawa, Garuwa, Ghuruwa, Bari. What is this all about?
  • See, the farm loan waiver was essential and we did that. But that is only a temporary relief. We need to revive the rural economy and make it sustainable. For improving the living standards of the farmers, we have given this slogan: Chhattisgarh ke chaar chinari, narawa, garuwa, ghuruwa, bari. Narawa is rivulets. There is no dearth of water in Chhattisgarh, but we need to get that to the farms. The second point [garuwa] is livestock. At one time, cattle were an integral part of the rural economy, but now they are a liability. They roam around the place, destroy crops. We need to turn them into a strength. We need to keep them at one place and provide fodder. We will use the dung for organic manure and cooking gas. Our dependence on chemical fertilizers can be brought down. Stubble burning is a major issue. We can turn that into fodder. The third component [ghuruwa] is recycling. We want to create a virtuous cycle for strengthening the rural economy so that bari [farming] becomes profitable all over again. We also plan to set up food processing facilities across the State.
  • Another key challenge before Chhattisgarh is Maoism. How do you plan to deal with it?
  • Guns are not the solution. But I don’t think we should be talking to Naxals. I think we should be talking to the victims of Naxalism. We need a political, economic and social approach. For 15 years, Raman Singh tried one path. Now, after Jammu and Kashmir, we have the maximum number of paramilitary forces in the country, in Bastar. From three blocks, Maoists are now in 15 districts in 15 years.
  • Chhattisgarh has also been very harsh on civil society organisations and activists.
  • Yes, also journalists. They were put in jail. The law was misused. All this needs to be evaluated and reformed.
  • Will you roll back the hostility towards civil society organisations in the State?
  • We will discuss with all. We will ask them what is the way forward. Why are the tribals in the grip of such fear?
  • Are you planning a purge in the State’s bureaucracy?
  • Those who work as if they are BJP activists will face the consequences. Those who want to work as per the law will be protected and promoted. We need to tell them that your accountability is to the administration, but also to the people at large, not only to a handful of companies or industrialists.
  • You were chosen above three others as Chief Minister. Is there any lingering tension between you and them?
  • Where you have four candidates, that means we were working with a model of collective leadership for the last five years. But only one can be Chief Minister. Now the government will also run under the same collective leadership. We are not going to be separate. Rahulji always says all sections of society must feel that the government is mine.
  • Will you be vacating the post for a colleague after half the term?

    • Many miles to Mecca

    The government’s proposal to ferry Haj pilgrims between Mumbai and Jeddah is an exercise in anachronism

  • The Central government’s proposal to ferry Haj pilgrims between Mumbai and Jeddah calls for a serious rethink, notwithstanding its laudable intention of providing an opportunity for poorer pilgrims to travel to Mecca. On the face of it, the move looks ill-conceived and appears to be an exercise in anachronism.
  • The current arrangement for the Haj pilgrimage by the Haj Committee of India has worked well ever since sea voyages were phased out in 1995 and the Haj administration was decentralised. Flights from 21 cities in India take pilgrims to Jeddah in 6-8 hours. Pilgrims have to spend a maximum of six days in and around Mecca to carry out the core rituals of the Haj. Most pilgrims also stay for 10 days in Medina, the Prophet’s adopted city. The Haj Committee schedule stretches across 40 days.
  • It is doubtful whether any sea voyage would take less than eight days for an average pilgrim between Mumbai and Jeddah. The most modern vessels travel at a speed of 20 nautical miles an hour. Given this speed, the journey between Mumbai and Jeddah (2,400 nautical miles) would require at least five days if weather conditions are favourable, which is not always the case. Normally, a passenger vessel carries 4,000-5,000 people. This means pilgrims at both ends will require a day to complete the formalities of customs and immigration. Add to this a day’s journey by train to Mumbai from the pilgrim’s point of origin.
  • In contrast to flight arrangements, the sea route entails centralisation of Haj arrangements. It presupposes that all pilgrims will be clustered in Mumbai for embarkation. Flights from provincial capitals had drastically eased the rigours of passage to the holy cities. Haj houses had come up in State capitals and were taking care of regional clusters.
  • Besides being anachronistic, sea voyages were discarded as they were misused by cartels in Mumbai. Children were ferried from States such as West Bengal, Bihar and Assam for organised begging in holy places. Some of them were passed on to unscrupulous elements to be used in camel races. There were also instances of poor women being lured by persons posing as their mehram (blood relative or guardian for the journey) who instead trapped them in domestic servitude work in West Asia. The restoration of ships would reopen the floodgates for misuse yet again.
  • The authorities need to assess the cumbersome formalities involved in reintroducing sea voyages. In Malaysia and Indonesia, Haj Boards mobilise savings, invest them in profitable ventures, constantly add dividends to deposits, and charter flights through open bidding. Such measures could be thought of as alternatives to sea travel, which has outlived its utility.